





Perhaps no argument has done more to set the direction of contemporary 
philosophy of mind than the “multiple realizability argument.” First 
championed by Hilary Putnam and later reformulated by Jerry Fodor, the 
argument begins with the observation that a given psychological property 
can be realized by any number of diverse physical systems, and then ends 
with the conclusion that psychological properties are irreducible vis-à-vis 
the physical sciences.^ Its target, in other words, is type physicalism and 
the unity of science, as traditionally conceived.
According to one popular criticism, however, the multiple realizability 
argument has been discredited by the fact that physical properties are also 
multiply realized} But this, I believe, is a mistake. While the criticism 
does serve to bring a number of important issues into better focus, it can 
be shown that the facts about physical multiple realization are perfectly 
consistent with the Putnam-Fodor style argument, and that, when such 
facts are rightly understood, they do not vitiate the original point about 
the irreducibility of psychological properties.
/. Multiple Realization
In spite of much talk about multiple realization, philosophers have 
generally been content to leave this central concept unanalyzed. I shall try 
to remedy this situation by indicating the two most salient features of the 
concept. First, there is the idea that a property is realized by a number of 
diverse states, which I take to mean that different state types can provide 
lawfully sufficient conditions for the instantiation of the multiply realized 
property. And second, there is the idea that among this range of diverse
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states, there are no lawfully necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
instantiation of that property. This suggests, then, the following definition, 
where M is a multiply realized property, R the realization base, and P any 
property within R:
M is multiply realized with respect to a range of properties R if and only if 
(a) R contains some property P which is nomologically sufficient for the 
instantiation of M; and yet (b) R contains no property P which is 
nomologically necessary and sufficient for the instantiation o f M.
Clause (a) allows for the existence of one-way conditional laws of the 
form (x)(Px = >  Mx), thus giving substance to the claim that it is P in 
virtue of which an object realizes M. Clause (b), however, disallows the 
existence of any laws of the form (x) (Mx < = > Px), thus denying that 
there are nomological coextensions between M and any property P within 
the multiple realization base. This latter point is the critical one upon 
which the whole debate has turned, for the crux of the multiple 
realizability argument consists in the denial of any nomological coexten­
sions between at least some important psychological properties and any 
physical properties.
So, applying this to the case at hand, let M be a given psychological 
property, R be the entire range of physical properties, and P any specific 
property within this range. The claim, then, is that there are important 
psychological properties for which the concept of multiple realization, so 
defined, will hold.
One final matter of clarification before we turn to the argument in 
support of this claim. I shall assume that the psychological properties in 
question are taken from our best cognitive science, and that the range of 
physical properteis are taken from a physical or natural science, that is, 
biology, chemistry, or physics. This is certainly the way matters were 
understood in the debate over reducing a special or human science to a 
more basic physical theory, and it also fits nicely with the more traditional 
controversy about mind/brain identity, points which I shall return to at 
length.
In any case, the aforementioned claim about multiply realized 
psychological properties is of great interest since, if true, it would show 
that a number of traditional philosophical views are mistaken. First and 
foremost, the doctrine of type physicialism would be in error, since it holds 
that all mental properties are identical to physical properties, and it is a 
necessary condition on the identity of properties that they be nomologically 
coextensive. Second, any view in the philosophy of science according to 
which psychological theory actually reduces to physical theory by means of 
biconditional bridge laws would be equally mistaken, at least insofar as the 
bridge laws are taken to express a genuine nomological connection 
between the properties.
Now there are roughly three reasons which have been given to accept
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the multiple realizability claim. The first, which I call the appeal to 
“anomalous realization,” is the denial of lawful psychophysical coextensions 
based upon the allegedly lawless character of any generalization which 
contains a psychological term.^ The second, which I call the appeal to 
“macro realization,” is the denial of lawful psychophysical coextensions 
based upon an analogy with macro-level types, like being a bridge or a 
table, which have no uniform microstructures underlying their instances."  ̂
And the third, the argument I will briefly canvass here, is the appeal to 
“functional realization” made famous by Putnam and Fodor.^
Hence, according to functionalist theory, and presupposed by standard 
computational models in psychology, our minds are described in the most 
theoretically useful way as functional mechanisms, with their mental states 
being described accordingly as the things which have the appropriate 
functional roles within this type of system. Thus, a functional property is 
one defined in terms of such roles, for example, the roles specified by the 
states of a Turing machine, a method that was once popular; or by a 
computer program for our cognitive system; or, what is now fashionable, 
by Ramsey sentences which define psychofunctional properties by their 
causal role in our best empirical theory of the mind.^
But the important point about functional properties, however we 
understand them, is that they exhibit extreme compositional plasticity in 
their instantiation. That is, functional properties can be shared by objects 
of radically different composition and behavior even to the point that they 
have nothing interesting in common physically. To take a familiar case, 
two computers with distinct hardware can be functionally isomorphic 
insofar as they share the functions specified in their programs (or insofar as 
they satisfy the same Ramsey predicates which define their functional 
properties). Hence the one may have computer chips made of germanium, 
while the other may employ the more familiar silicon chips. Or, to 
dramatize the point, the second may have no chips at all, operating instead 
by vacuum tubes made of glass and wire, or by punched cards, copper 
needles, and wheels and pulleys.
The consequence, however, is that there seems to be no chance at all that 
the same type of physical state realizes the functional properties in each of 
the two systems. For what physical property could be coextensive (let alone 
nomologically coextensive) with a functional property shared by the 
activation of a silicon chip and the movement of a copper needle through a 
punched card? Consult all the physical sciences, there simply are no 
plausible candidates.
Since this point has everything to do with functional properties as such, 
and nothing to do with the specifics of the example, what holds for the 
functional states of the computer holds for the functional states 
countenanced in psychology. Hence the above example can be extended to 
include a functionally isomorphic human being. Or, if we dislike the
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comparison of humans and machines, the same story can be told using 
only down to earth, flesh and blood creatures. For example, certain mental 
properties of human beings can remain constant while the neurology 
differs, especially when damage has occurred to one portion of the brain, 
and another area has taken over the psychological function. Or it might be 
that the same psychological states are realized by nonhuman creatures, 
say, those in another solar system. But given the likely differences in 
environment, selective pressures, and evolutionary development, it is 
extremely implausible to think such creatures would have anything like our 
own neurology.
The net result, as functionalists have emphasized, is that a type of 
psychological state can be realized in a seemingly infinite number of 
physically dissimilar ways—by differing neurological structures, extra­
terrestrial X fibers, silicon chips, pulleys and wheels—as long as these 
things play the appropriate role within a cognitive system. Yet among this 
variety of physical structures which are sufficient to realize M there does 
not seem to he any physical property P which is nomologically necessary 
and sufficient for M, which is precisely the claim about multiply realized 
psychological properties. Indeed, the logic of the situation seems to be 
this. Take any P allegedly coextensive with M.'The nature of functional 
properties would seem to guarantee the possibility (a genuine nomic 
possibility) of a system constructed to realize M without P, as in the case 
of our two computers.
So much, then, for the argument. Let us turn to the criticism.
II. Multiply Realized Physical Properties
The criticism can be seperated into two quite different strategies. One 
requires that we adjust our notion of a property, either by introducing the 
broader infinite disjunctive properties or the narrower species-specific 
variety, with the effect that at least some psychophysical laws will be 
forthcoming.^ The other strategy leaves our notion of a property intact, 
and challenges the very logic of the multiple realizability argument. This 
latter response is the one we will examine in detail here.
As indicated earlier, this line of response is based upon the observation 
that physical types and properties are also multiply realized. Jaegwon Kim 
was the first to suggest that this might create a problem, and he expressed 
the point in this way:
We of course should not expect to find a physical correlate for every type of mental 
event we commonly distinguish in daily discourse . . . But the situation is hardly peculiar 
to mental events; we do not expect to find a microphysical basis uniquely correlating 
with, say, tables either. But this is not to say that tables are not physico-chemical
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structures or that some aspects of tables are not explicable in terms of their 
microphysical properties.®
Hence the common table provides us with a genuine physical type which is 
multiply realized by distinct microphysical properties. Of course, tables are 
human artifacts. Hence it is not terribly surprising that the property of 
being a table lacks a microphysical coextension. But Kim also mentions 
the case of temperature, noting that:
To argue that the human brain and the canine brain cannot be in the same brain state 
because of their different physico-chemical structure is like arguing that there can be no 
microphysical state underlying temperature because all kinds of objects with extremely 
diverse microphysical compositions can have the same temperature . . . difference in 
material composition with respect to the kind of atoms involved, for example, does not 
imply difference in the mean kinetic energy of the molecules.^
The point again is that temperature is a genuine physical property, one 
which may even have an underlying microphysical correlate (mean kinetic 
energy), in spite of the fact that it is realized by various microphysical 
compositions, in this case, by different types of atoms. The consequence, 
in Kim’s words, is that this fact should “mitigate the sting of Putnam’s 
argument considerably.”^̂
Donald Davidson has also given a similar argument about multiply 
realized physical properties, only in this case applied to human action:
It is often said, especially in recent philosophical literature, that there cannot be a 
physical predicate with the extension of a verb of action . . . because there are so many 
different ways in which an action may be performed. Thus a man may greet a woman by 
bowing, by saying any number of things, by winking, by whistling; and each of these 
things may in turn be done in endless ways. The point is fatuous. The particulars that fall 
under a predicate always differ in endless ways, as long as there are at least two 
particulars. If the argument were a good one, we could show that acquiring a positive 
charge is not a physical event, since there are endless ways in which this may happen.
The idea again is that a physical event type or property like acquiring a 
positive charge remains undeniably physical even though, like a type of 
action, it can be realized in endless ways. Indeed, Davidson takes the 
irreducibility argument in question to be “fatuous” precisely because 
multiple realization is so easily attained by the mental and physical alike.
Finally, Mark Wilson has recently drawn our attention to a number of 
multiply realized properties in the physical sciences, focusing especially on 
the case of temperature.^^ What is interesting here, over and above the 
facts f>ointed out by Kim, is the observation that it is not simply that 
temperature is realized by various microstates, with the correlation 
between temperature and mean kinetic energy being preserved. Rather,
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that correlation generally fails, and it fails in a way that provides a striking 
parallel with psychological properties:
If one reexamines the derivation in Ernest Nagel’s The Structure of Science which seems 
to have propelled this particular example into the philosophical limelight, one sees that 
the mathematics is germane only to a classical gas and won’t go through for an arbitrary 
system. Worse yet, there seems to be no “structural” formula of the expected type which 
will tell us what temperature should be in all substances.
We are then told that the correlation fails in quantum mechanics for dense 
gases at low temperatures, and that it fails in Einstein’s model for solids, 
which is just to say that temperature is realized by one thing in ideal gases 
of a certain range  ̂ by another thing in dense gases at low temperaturesy by 
yet another thing in Einsteinian solids, and so on.̂ "̂  But this is very much 
like saying that a psychological property is realized by one thing in normal 
humans, by another thing in brain damaged patients, by another thing in 
extraterrestrials, and the like! Yet, as Wilson emphasizes, in spite of this 
analogy we are convinced that temperature is a physical property.
Hence, taking all these points together, the sum of the matter seems to 
be this—since we do not conclude that multiply realized physical 
properties are nonphysical, then, by parity of reasoning, we cannot 
conclude that multiply realized psychological properties are nonphysical.
III. The Real Lesson of Multiple Realization
But what, exactly, follows from the point that physical properties are 
multiply realized? Contrary to the above line of response, I think we can 
happily concede the existence of multiply realized physical properties and 
still maintain that the original claim has been established, namely, that 
psychological properties are not lawfully coextensive and hence not 
identical to physical properties in virtue of being multiply realized by 
them.
First, remember that a property M is multiply realized with respect to a 
range of properties R, its realization base, if and only if (a) R contains a 
property P which is sufficient for M, and yet (b) R contains no property P 
which is necessary and sufficient for M.
Now observe that it is fairly easy for a property to be multiply realized, 
even a physical one. Consider Davidson’s case of acquiring a positive 
charge. The property of acquiring a positive charge is indeed multiply 
realized with respect to a wide range of physical properties—simply let R 
be a set of physical properties which are sufficient, but not necessary, to 
bring about a positive charge (say, the set which includes only certain 
macro properties of an ignition system). Nothing of interest follows save
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that acquiring a positive charge is not identical to any physical property 
within this particular realization base.
On the other hand, the point is not entirely ‘‘fatuous,” as Davidson 
claims. For let R range over all the physical properties, including the 
microphysical property of having a distribution of protons over electrons, 
and acquiring a positive charge is no longer multiply realized. That is, 
acquiring a positive charge is identical to having a distribution of protons 
over electrons, and so condition (b) in our definition of multiple 
realization is not satisfied.
Or consider the case of water. Even though the property of being water 
is identical with that of H2 O, and admittedly physical, it is nevertheless 
multiply realized with respect to many physical properties—again, restrict 
R to a set of properties which are sufficient, but not necessary, to insure 
the presence of water (say, certain atmospheric conditions, H2 O excluded, 
which bring about humidity). It follows that the property of being water is 
not identical to any property within this particular realization base. But let 
R range over all the physical properties, including that of H2 O, and water 
is no longer multiply realized.
Consider now the case of a psychological property. What is interesting 
here is that, unlike the previous cases, a given psychological property can 
be multiply realized with respect to the entire range of physical propertiesl 
The realization base, in other words, may contain any of the properties of 
physical science, and this, precisely because no physical property provides 
both a necessary and sufficient condition for the instantiation of a 
psychological property, as the functionalist argument was intended to 
show.
So this is why we can accept the point that physical properties, like 
psychological properties, are multiply realized, while at the same time 
maintaining that psychological properties are not identical to physical 
properties. The reason is that they are multiply realized with respect to 
different sets of properties. The moral is that, from a philosophical point 
of view, what makes matters interesting is the range of the realization base.
How, then, does temperature stand with respect to the entire range of 
physical properties? As we have seen, temperature does not have a 
microphysical or molecular correlate, which makes it unlike water and 
positive charges. Nevertheless, the identification with the physical is 
straightforward. For temperature is not multiply realized with respect to 
all the physical properties because temperature is itself a property of 
physical science (thermodynamics), and no property is multiply realized 
with respect to itself.
Now this answer may strike one as worse than pedantic. After all, a 
psychological property is not multiply realized with respect to itself either, 
and so in both cases we can say that the property in question is multiply 
realized with respect to an indefinitely wide range of physical properties
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excluding itself. So how, on the basis of this similarity, can we draw a 
different conclusion about them vis-à-vis their status as a physical 
property? Or, given this similarity, why not count temperature as 
nonphysical too?
But the question betrays a confusion which I take underlies this entire 
line of response. The confusion is that the phenomenon of multiple 
realization should provide a criterion for what is to count as nonphysical. 
This, after all, was the whole point of drawing our attention to multiply 
realized physical properties. But to insist that multiple realization provide 
such a criterion, or that a defender of the argument must believe it to do 
so, is simply a mistake.
So my answer to the question: “How can we draw a different conclusion 
about them vis-à-vis their status as a physical property?” will be that other 
criteria are used to count something as a physical property, meaning here 
that it is a property of physical science. And more generally, then, since 
other criteria are used to place an item like temperature in the domain of 
physical science and assign others to psychology, this leaves multiple 
realization to enter only afterward as a proof that the pre-categorized 
types are not identical.
Thus, the debate in the philosophy of psychology, taken up early on by 
the positivists, and more recently by Putnam and Fodor, concerned the 
identification of psychological properties with those of biology, chemistry, 
or physics. Clearly it was not multiple realization which was used to 
classify these properties into their respective categories. In the case of 
psychology, for example, the properties and states are typically thought to 
be explanatory of rational activity and involved in the etiology of 
purposeful behavior—criteria which are ill suited for the classification of a 
physical state, given that physical science seeks to explain phenomena 
which are not rational and which do not “behave” in the psychological 
sense at all.
It goes without saying, also, that since temperature does not explain 
rational activity, then, in spite of its being realized by various other 
physical states, it falls outside the category of a psychological property. 
Indeed, it is the different criteria I am vaguely referring to which 
determined the distinct sets of generalizations that we find within the 
sciences. In any case, the point I wish to make is that with the pre­
categorized domains already in existence, multiple realization then 
provided a way of answering the questions which would naturally arise 
about inter-theoretic identity.
The same thing is true in the context of the mind/body debate, as it was 
carried out, for example, by dualists and central state materialists. There 
was a certain class of things like pains and thoughts which were grouped 
together under the heading of “the mental.” What guided the choice of 
such items was certain special features which they alone enjoyed, like
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phenomenal quality (for the sensations), intentionality (for the proposi­
tional attitudes), and on some accounts a private or direct access had by 
the subject of those mental states (the introspective states). The question 
then arose as to whether these things could be reduced to others, more 
precisely, whether the mental types were identical to neurological, 
chemical, or basic physical types. What counted as “the physical,” then, 
was again just the things which are included in the physical sciences. So, 
roughly, a property is mental if and only if it falls under intentional, 
phenomenal, or introspective state types, and a property is physical if and 
only if it falls under biological, chemical, or basic physical types.
What these historical reminders serve to show are three important 
things. First, it is not true that a property is classified as being mental or 
nonphysical if and only if it is multiply realized (and hence it is a mistake 
to think that an item like temperature is mental or nonphysical just 
because it is multiply realized). For that we use other criteria. Second, and 
consequently, multiple realizability should not be saddled with the work of 
these other criteria. And third, the only work our multiple realizability 
argument can be expected to do is precisely to show that mental properties 
are not reducible to physical properties, all understood by their proper 
criteria.
Put differently, multiple realization by itself provides a test for identity, 
not nonphysicality; but being a test for identity, it is nevertheless adequate 
to show that psychological properties are not identical to physical 
properties. How is this accomplished? Again, by taking the pre­
categorized properties in question, the psychological and the physical, and 
then applying the test of multiple realization. The result is that when it is 
applied to the entire range of physical properties, it is exceedingly 
probable that the test will come out negative, as far as identity and lawful 
coextensiveness are concerned.
IV. A Question About Intuitive Physical Properties
There is, I think, one final matter which needs to be resolved. Granted, 
multiple realization may show that psychological properties are not 
identical to physical properties, where the latter are understood as the 
properties of physical science. All the same, perhaps this is too narrow a 
conception of the physical—witness other intuitive physical properties like 
that of being a ta b le .In  other words, the property of being a table is not 
found within physical science either, though it is presumably physical in 
some other sense of the term. Hence, my arguments thus far leave open 
the possibility that psychological properties will count as physical in some 
intuitively broader sense as well.
Now I concede that this is true. Psychologically properties might count
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as physical in some intuitively broader sense. But there are three points 
which I think will considerably diminish whatever force this objection may 
have. First, as my brief historical remarks were intended to show, the 
conception of a physical property at play in the debate was that of being a 
property of physical science. The dispute in the philosophy of psychology, 
again, concerned the reduction of a human or special science to a physical 
or natural science (that is, the Geistes Wissenschaften to the Naturwissen­
schaften)', the traditional mind/body debate concerned the identity of 
phenomenal, intentional, and introspective state types with neurological, 
chemical, or basic physical types. Either way, it was physical science which 
circumscribed the legitimate bounds of the physical. Psychological 
properties, then, are irreducible vis-à-vis those properties, and nothing 
which appeals to a wider notion of the physical will detract from this point.
Second, we might try to deny the original datum which motivates this 
intuitively broader notion of the physical, whatever it may be, by denying 
that intuitive physical properties like a table are purely physical. How 
could this be? Perhaps because “being a table” cannot be specified without 
recourse to psychological notions, specifically, the intention that the object 
be used for certain purposes (a point which follows from the fact that there 
are no purely structural necessary and sufficient conditions for being a 
table). Now it might be thought that this point has a fairly limited 
application since there are other intuitive physical properties which do not 
involve an appeal to human intention, for example, being a rock, a tree, or 
even a planet. But notice that these are properties of physical science, of 
geology, biology, and astrophysics respectively; and hence they would 
count as physical on the criterion employed throughout, namely, being a 
property of physical science.
Of course, in response, one might question why psychological theory 
should not also count as one of these higher-level physical sciences.B ut 
our answer should now be clear. Psychological theory does not count as a 
physical science according to the traditional classification which was at 
work in the debate (it is a human or special science, not a physical or 
natural one; and, what lies behind this distinction, it deals with 
phenomenal, intentional, and introspective state types, as opposed to the 
other sciences). Moreover, its properties are not reducible to the 
properties of those physical sciences. Hence, to call psychology a “higher- 
level physical science” would be a victory in name only. Nothing of 
substance would be gained, and all the original concerns would 
remain—how a human science relates to the others, how the intentional 
relates to the nonintentional, how a private phenomenal experience relates 
to the publicly accessible facts, and so on. Such concerns are not addresed 
by simply renaming psychology as a physical science.
Finally, my third point is that even if we do appeal to a broader and 
more intuitive notion of the physical, one which would include properties
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like being a table, and even if these other properties are not covertly 
psychological in the way suggested above, still, I doubt that psychological 
properties will count as physical on any intuitive scheme of classification. 
Why? Because it was precisely this kind of classification which was at work 
in the traditional mind/body debate. Specifically, it was an intuitive 
division of things based upon the prima facie difference between the 
intentional, the phenomenal, and the introspective, versus other things 
which do not have these features. Mental properties fall on one side. And 
the intuitive physical properties, like being a table, fall on the other. It 
therefore requires a philosophical theory to identify these intuitively 
distinct and separately classified items; or, as I have insisted upon, it 
requires the multiple realizability argument to show that they cannot be 
identified.
In conclusion, then, it seems that on our best and most interesting 
conception of what it is to be a physical property, the multiple realizability 
argument will suffice to show that psychological properties are not to be 
identified with physical properties. In particular, the mere fact that some 
physical properties are multiply realized by others is-of no consequence. 
The mental and the physical will have distinct realization bases, and only 
in the case of the mental can a given property be realized with respect to 
the entire range of physical properties.
University of Michigan 
Ann Arbor, Michigan
NOTES
 ̂ Hilary Putnam, “The Nature of Mental States,” in Mind, Language and Reality 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 429-440; and Jerry Fodor, “The 
Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis),” in 
Representations (Cambridge Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1981), pp. 127-145.
 ̂The criticism is found in Jaegwon Kim, “Phenomenal Properties, Psychophysical 
Laws, and the Identity Theory,” Monist, vol. 56 (1972), pp. 190-191; Donald Davidson, 
“The Material Mind,” in Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford University Press, 1980), 
pp. 251-252; and Mark Wilson, “What Is This Thing Called ‘Pain’?—the Philosophy of 
Science Behind the Contemporary Debate,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 66 
(1985), pp. 227-267.
 ̂Donald Davidson, “Mental Events,” in Essays on Actions and Events, pp. 207-225; 
and “Psychology as Philosophy,” ibid., pp. 229-244.
Thomas Nagel seems to have argued in this way. See his “Physicalism,” The 
Philosophical Review, vol. 74 (1965), pp. 351-352.
 ̂ Because functional theories are apt to raise the philosopher’s brow, it should be 
noted that the present argument does not require any commitment to the controversial 
“psycho-functional identity theory.” For the latter theory identifies commonsense or folk 
psychological properties with functional properties, and this may well be false given that 
commonsense states have not only “compositional” plasticity, as commonly argued, but
ON PHYSICAL MULTIPLE REALIZATION 223
also “computational” plasticity. See Putnam, Representation and Reality (Cambridge 
Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1988); and cp. Ned Block, “Troubles with Functionalism,” in Block, 
ed.. Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1 (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1980), pp. 291-293. Hence, our discussion must be restricted to the functional 
properties of psychology and not any common mental properties. All the same, our 
argument is not affected. If anything, it is enhanced. Common mental properties are 
multiply realized by functional states, and they in turn by diverse physical states, making 
type physicalism appear doubly mistaken. The mental is, as it were, twice removed from 
the physical.
 ̂See Ned Block, “What Is Functionalism?,” in Block, ed., Readings in Philosophy of 
Psychology, vol. 1, pp. 171-184; and Jerry Fodor, “Something of the State of the Art,” 
in Representations, pp. 1-31.
 ̂The appeal to infinite disjunctive properties is made by Jaegwon Kim in 
“Supervenience and Nomological Incommensurables,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 
vol. 15 (1978), pp. 149-156; and “Concepts of Supervenience,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, vol. 45 (1984), pp. 153-176. The appeal to species-specific 
properties is made by Kim in “Phenomenal Properties, Psychophysical Laws, and the 
Identity Theory,” ibid., p. 190; David Lewis, “Mad Pain and Martian Pain,” in Block, 
Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, pp. 219-220; and Berent Enc, “In Defense 
of the Identity Theory,” Journal of Philosophy, vol. 80, (1983), pp. 289-291.
Species-specific properties have yet to be criticized in the literature, though I think it is 
clear that the proposal faces a number of difficulties, e.g., that multiple realization can 
occur within our species due to the plasticity of the brain. As for infinite disjunctive 
properties, I agree with the critics that such properties are ontologically objectionable 
since they do not do the work which properties are chiefly called upon to do, i.e., ground 
“objective resemblances” and contribute to an object’s “causal powers.” See D. M. 
Armstrong, A Theory of Universals (London: Cambridge University Press, 1978), esp. 
pp. 19-23; and Paul Teller, “Comments on Kim’s Paper,” Southern Journal of 
Philosophy, vol. 22 (1983), Supplement, pp. 57-61. Moreover, even granting infinite 
disjunctive physical properties, they will fail to reduce psychological properties on the 
assumption that it is nomically or at least metaphysically possible for a mental type to be 
realized in nonphysical systems—a possibility, it seems, which is not precluded by the 
nature of functional states. See Shoemaker, “Some Varieties of Functionalism,” in J. I. 
Biro and Robert Shahan, eds.. Mind, Brain, and Function (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1982), p. 98; and cp. Putnam, “The Nature of Mental States,” pp. 
435-436.
 ̂ Kim, “Phenomenal Properties, Psychophysical Laws, and the Identity Theory,” p. 
191; see also “Supervenience and Nomological Incommensurables,” p. 151.
 ̂ “Phenomenal Properties, Psychophysical Laws, and the Identity Theory,” p. 190; cp. 
also Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt Brace & World Inc., 
1961), p. 314.
“Phenomenal Properties, Psychophysical Laws, and the Identity Theory,” p. 190.
Davidson, “The Material Mind,” pp. 251-252.
Wilson, “What Is This Thing Called ‘Pain’?—the Philosophy of Science Behind the 
Contemporary Debate,” pp. 228-235. Aside from this, what is perhaps the main thrust 
of Wilson’s paper is the claim that physics employs “extremely generous mathematical 
methods for constructing new traits” which will guarantee that all psychological 
properties have a lawfully coextensive physical property (ibid., p. 232). The argument, 
however, is not especially clear, and his examples appear to raise a number of different 
points. It suffices to say that if the physical property in question is indeed lawfully 
coextensive with the mental type, then either the physical system required to instantiate 
the property or the property itself would need to be wildly disjunctive (succumbing to all
224 PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
the concerns mentioned in n. 7). At least some such worry led one commentator to say 
that the system “must comprise most of the universe”, and hence that the property in 
question would be physical in only a trivial and philosophically uninteresting sense. See 
Alan Nelson, “Physical Properties,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 66 (1985), p. 
276.
“What Is This Thing Called ‘Pain’?—the Philosophy of Science Behind the 
Contemporary Debate,” p. 228.
Wilson, ibid.; see also Enc, “In Defense of the Identity Theory,” p. 289.
I omit reference to other physical sciences, e.g., geology, astronomy, and 
astrophysics, simply because no one has proposed that mental properties be reduced to 
properties in their domain.
I owe this point to Louis Loeb.
Stephen Yablo brought this point to my attention.
A question raised by an anonymous reader of this journal.
I should like to thank Jaegwon Kim, Louis Loeb, William Taschek, and Stephen 
Yablo for their many helpful comments on this paper.
